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Theories of learning: What now?
From Activity Theory to Situated Cognition
117418
Important features of the theory of situated cognition, that
will be considered, successively, include:
In a recent issue of Vinculum (September 2001 pp 8-13), I
reported on developments of a socio-cultural theory of
learning: activity theory. I focused on some of Vygotskys
and his colleagues' contributions to the psychology of
learning, and mentioned briefly that there have been other
developments in recent times.
One major development of the quiet revolution towards
theories that see knowledge as socio-contextual has been
the unfolding of theories of situated cognition.
As in socio-cultural theories such as Vygotsky's activity
theory, knowledge for situation cognitionists is held in
the social sphere, by groups of people - but the theory
develops this idea further.
With situated cognition, common concepts, patterns of
action and interaction, and tools used are not only
shared, but are shaped by interaction with the situation
and also help to shape the situation. Thus action takes
place not merely in or on an environment, but with it.
Note that situatedness here is not merely physical. "It is
not possible to walk into a situation. Instead, language
use and, thus, meaning are situated in interested,
intersubjectively negotiated social interaction" (Lave,
1991,p.67).
Situated cognition is not just one theory, but a growing
theoretical movement that had its roots in neo-Marxist
theories of practice (e.g. Lave &: Wenger, 1991), from
philosophical situation theory (Barwiseand Perry, 1983),
and Deweyian pragmatism (e.g. Schon, 1983).
In fact, situated cognition is not a theory of knowledge or
learning as much as a theory of social practice - a theory
about the ways that humans interact in social settings, of
which learning is only one dimension.
Situated cognition is not a single view, but one that
"generates interconnected views of perception,
cognition, language, learning. agency, the social world,
and their interrelations" (Lave, 1988, p. 66). Clearly it
developed out of activity theory, but is still very much
"work in progress" (Kirshner and Whitson, 1997, p. 4).
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• Cognition is situated in communities;
• Community goals;
• Dialectic relationships;
• A mind-body-environment nexus; and
• The tool of language.
• Cognition is situated in communities
It is not often that we think of activity as knowledge, but
one key idea of situated cognition is that situated activity
is "a distributed form of cognition" (Lave, 1988, p. 1).
This means that certain common understandings are
played out by groups of people involved in shared
practices in particular settings. Whether they be
architects, sport participants, principals, teenagers,
members of parliament, publishers, or mathematics
teachers, there are patterns of activity that need to be
learned by neophyte participants if they are to become
true and active members of the group.
This idea of knowledge being bound in particular
contexts is not difficult to accept. As teachers, for
example, we know that many of the tools (including
words and patterns of language use, aids to teaching and
learning, traditional behaviours and ways of reacting)
that are common in classrooms but rarely used
elsewhere. We know, too, that the concepts and
procedures taught in school mathematics are somewhat
different from those that children would meet in non-
school contexts and even different from those used' by
expert mathematicians.
The theory of situated cognition does not say that such
transfer is impossible - we all know that that is not the
case because we see evidence of successful transfer
frequently It does recognise though that transfer is not a
simple process and that the ability of a person to transfer
knowledge from one context to another should not be
taken for granted. The knowledge must be re-created in
each new context by cognitive activity, and perhaps some
trial and learning. This has implications for both teachers
as well as curriculum developers, so I will return to this
point below.
• Community goals
The best known exponents of situated cognition theory,
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (e.g. 1991) raised the
notion of learning as being distributed among eo-
participants in any social situation. Here the theory
differs from constructivism - as do all theories that have
been developed in the socio-cultural field - in that
knowledge is created by social groups acting together.
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Individual "learning" is not separate from participation in
social activities or from changes in a social identities. .
In relation to mathematics education, there are many
relevant communities of practice that have their own
typical ways of thinking and working, including,
learners, textbook authors and publishers, parents,
academics, curriculum developers, and mathematics
teachers. Mathematics students need to come to grips
with what it is to be a member of a community of
learners in a classroom and school, and also what it is to
be a mathematician - or at least a school mathematician,
for most mathematicians say there is little in common
between the way mathematicians work and the way
school mathematics works.
The learning of mathematics, like any learning, is a
process of socialisation into a community of
understanding.
Each context has its mentors and role models, so the
notion of apprenticeship has proved useful in the theory of
situated cognition. In any community of learners, initially
neophytes participate on the periphery but increasingly
they take on more dominant roles and participate in ways
that shape the setting and its activities (Lave and Wenger,
1991).
Lave and Wenger later termed this "legitimate
peripheral participation" 0991, p. 40). In the
apprenticeship model, both the ways in which work is
produced .and the nature of mastery are shaped by "old
timers" through social interaction - including but not
restricted to modelling.
"Apprentices learn to think, argue, act and interact in
increasingly knowledgeable ways, with people who do
something well, by doing it with them as legitimate
peripheral participants" (1988, p. 19).
Their participation becomes more central as their skills
and knowledge grow, forming a bridge between the
individual and the warranted practices of the
community While "newcomers" have some agency in
this process they learn mainly by participation in
community activity
The partial participation by newcomers is by no means
'disconnected' from the practice of interest. Furthermore,
it is also a dynamic concept. In this case, peripherality,
when it is enabled, suggests an opening, a way of gaining
understanding through growing involvement. (Lave and
Wenger, 1991, p. 37)
The notion of cognitive apprenticeship (Brown,
Collins, &: Duguid, 1989) is also used in recognition that
any social context has a body of ideas-in-action that
learners need to come to grips with..
The sequences of interaction that need to be learned are
aligned to different group goals. For example, most
teachers use a "teacher question / student response /
teacher comment" pattern of interaction frequently in
their classrooms.
Pause for a moment to list mentally some of the reasons
why we use this common tool of the trade. My response
here would include:
leading a discussion of relevant content ideas forward
as a logical progression of main ideas;
• assessingwhat children know and keeping account of
growing understandings; and
• controlling behaviour and noise.
But you probably thought of some other equally valid
goals.
Students usually participate willingly in this pattern of
interaction, and you might want to reflect on how their
likely goals might differ from your own. Lave (1988,
199I) articulated a common goal for learners when they
wrote that many neophytes in workplaces are likely to be
cognisant of distinctions between:
(a) valued knowledge and practices, and
(b) what they themselves know and contribute, and
thus to be clear about what needs to be learned
and practised.
If the students' goals do not match the teachers' closely,
at least with both sides showing an acceptable level of
looseness and tolerance, then a less familiar sequence of
interactions results. The challenge to the situation (either
desirable, like when a student expresses an unexpected
insight; or undesirable when a student refuses to respond
of gives a very inappropriate response) changes the
familiar pattern of interaction. Adrenalin levels rise,
other students get involved and their roles change,
traditional power relationships are challenged, and
interpretations are often afforded a higher level of
ambiguity Such transactions might be effective in that
they contribute to the feeling that the classroom
participants are making some kind of sense together; but
in destructive transactions some participants will be
losers-and, in fact, the situation and everyone in it will be
affectedbecause future reliance on the tool is never quite
so predictable.
• Dialectic relationships
Dialectical (i.e. dual-aspect) relationships exist where
what might be thought of as separate components are
recognised to be two sides of the same coin - one cannot
exist without the other. Situated cognition dissolves (or
interconnects) the dualism between what is learned and
how it is learned (i.e. knowledge and activity), as well as
between knowledge and its uses (knowledge and
application). In situated cognition, the activities of
people and the environments in which they take place
are also viewed as elements in mutually-constructed
wholes. Mathematics is typically considered to be
decontextualised knowledge - after all that is the power
of its processes and its forms of representation - so it is a
challenge to consider that understandings of it remain
tied to specific contexts and actions.
People participate actively in a social context, with
behaviour being shaped by patterns of interaction
observed, opportunities afforded by others, dynamics of
interchanges, perceptions of a social group's
expectations, overt and subtle feedback on
contributions, and other evidence of successful
participation. While all of this is taking place, however,
the people are themselves making a contribution to the
social context. They follow and model patterns, or
perhaps divert from the norm to the extent that they
influence others and hence change future forms of
interaction. They give opportunities to others via their
own actions, making their own impact on the dynamics
of verbal and physical interchanges. They too help
develop and convey a social group's expectations, and
give various forms of appraisal to others about their
contributions.
Thus there is a process of mutual modification between
people and their social environments, with both
undergoing inseparable change over the course of any
period of time - from a short exchange such as a quick
interchange in a schoolroom to a year's participation in
mathematics lessons.
According to the theory of constructivism, an individual
learns by accommodating new knowledge into an
established conceptual framework, and that activity
might involve adaptation of the framework so that the
new ideas fit more comfortably (following Piaget's sense
of "accommodation"). In situated cognition, the process
of adaptation is more dynamic, involving mutual
modification rather than a matching process. It is
recognised that negotiation and adaptation of the group's
ideas will take place as interaction in the social context
proceeds. Thus the theory has been called "interactivist",
"relational", and "dialectical".
However, it is worth noting that those social contexts are
composed of individuals whose reflexive interactions
define the contexts, so these "cannot be understood
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without knowing the characteristics of the component
individuals and how these characteristics govern the
social processes that influence development" (Brownell
and Carriger's, 1991, p. 366). The context where one
becomes a successful learner, though, is generally shaped
only marginally by the activity of any particular learner.
In theories of situated cognition, learning is not a
separate activity, but "an integral part of generative social
practice in the lived-in world" (Lave and Wenger, 1991,
p.35).
The development of knowledge and social interactivity
are interdependent and indivisible. Thus the learning of
mathematics depends on opportunities for social
interaction within the contexts of the everyday
experiences that entail the use of mathematics, including
but not limited to schooling.
• A mind-body-environment nexus
Many theories of learning attend to relationships
between "mind" and "body". Situated cognition is no
exception, with its third dialectic factor being the social
"situation". The mind is a product of the interaction
between individuals and their environments.
Perception cannot be removed from action, because
every perception involves observation and analysis. This
internal activity shapes individuals' reactions - with even
a decision not to react being one form of reaction. Thus
perception and action and environmental change arise
together, trialectically forming each other.
Much of this happens at an unconscious level, so when a
need for problem-solving arises it usually does where the
pattern of activity is varied. The situation in which the
blockage (the recognition that a problem has been
encountered) occurs then forms the practical context for
thinking. Thus cognition is situated in an activity and in
a specific context, and both forming and testing
proposed solutions involve practical action in that
context. (An even stronger mind-body dualism, in the
theory enactivism, will be the subject of a further article
in this series of Vinculum articles on current learning
theories.)
The work of Anna Sfard should be of interest to
mathematics teachers here. Sfard (1991, 1994, 1998)
saw development of understanding in mathematics as
involving a "grasping the essence" through two quite
different activities: acquisition and participation.
Through these activities, understandings become reified
(that is, experience is transformed into something like an
object, it is thing-ified) over time as idiosyncratic,
relational images that arise from particular sets of
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cumulative experiences. The act of creating these abstract
entities involves transformation from an operational to a
structural mode of thinking.
One key pedagogical implication of this is that
operational forms generally precede structural forms -
understanding at a higher (structural) level is creativity
activity. (In similar vein, Gray and Tall devised the term
"precept" to indicate the constructive linking of process
and concept, as an anticipation of the fully developed
"process" and "related "concept"; 1994. The way that an
operational form may precede a more abstract
conceptual or structural form can also be seen in Piagets
classic account of "concrete" operations, where a learner
is able to handle a task, but only by directly working
with concrete manipulable objects to aid the mental
abstracting and processing.) An implication of this is that
operational activities should be ordered in ways that
facilitate children's development of bigger and more
abstract ideas.
Another important aspect is that this process of "grasping
the essence" is not necessarily a slow, steady or
predictable one - Sfard wrote about the phenomenon of
sudden illuminations (as in the classic Gestalt
"Aha!"moment of insight, or Archimedes' famous
"Eureka!" moment) that also enable further related
concepts to be illuminated. A vital aspect of Sfards work
has been identification of conceptual "objects" and
temporary barriers to mathematical understanding that
Secondary students must overcome. In Sfards work,
"objects",are abstract but meaningful ideas such negative
or directed numbers. They are "reihed" from learning
experiences. Some are very complex ideas, such as ~-1
(the square root of negative one). Similarly "barriers"
are conceptions that learners have developed that
prevent them from imagining the "objects". Temporary
barriers to understanding of these two particular
abstractions might be that negative numbers get smaller
and smaller as one counts -1, -2, -3, etc. (in fact, they do
get "smaller" in one sense, while their absolute
magnitude increases - the increasing "smallness" is quite
different from the approach towards zero as we count
down a sequence of proper fractions; 112, 1/3, 1/4, ...);
and a belief that square numbers are alwayspositive (true
in simple experience, but not assumed in the abstract).
'The techniques for adding, subtracting, multiplying
and dividing of signed numbers may be not very
difficult to master, but there are serious conceptual
dilemmas that students would invariably encounter if
they have an urge to understand what the notion of
negative number is all about. The question why a
product of two negative numbers should be positive
is probably the most famous of these dilemmas"
(Sfard, 2000, p. 158).
• The tool of language
Following the tradition of activity theory (and other
social theories of learning before that), language is seen
as a tool. That is, it helps the group and its members
achieve their purposes and helps individuals get what
they want. Participation in the language practices of
communities that we take part in increases as knowledge
of the community norms increases.
It is not only words and phrases that are commonly used
in communities that is important here, but the discourses
that underpin particular uses of language. For example,
it is common for teachers to use a question when they are
actually giving a command and are certainly not
expecting an answer; e.g. "Would you like to open your
textbooks now?" At other times a statement is a question;
e.g. "I presume you all know how to start.". Such
ambiguity is understood better by children in higher
socio-economic areas because this pattern of language
use is a middle class habit (see Zevenbergen, Sullivan
and Mousley, 2000).
Children who have richer backgrounds of experience
also cope better with ambiguities of language use in
varied contexts. For example, the notion of a "fraction" is
a very complex one whose use differs in various home,
school and community activities such as sharing discrete
or continuous objects of various sorts, advertising of
petrol prices, and calculating bank interest. Children
need to make sense of the meaning of "fraction" in these
contexts as well as in the more abstract and formal
context of school mathematics, and do so better if they
have been raised in environments where mentors
(parents, friends, teachers) have helped them to see
underpinning ideas and hence connections.
In any such context, making meaning through the
activity of language use (and language making) is a joint
activity because it is common experience that builds the
understandings held by a group and its members. Again,
individual teachers and students make an impact on
both the development of language in specific contexts
and the ways in which it can be used - and hence on the
course of lessons.
Implications of the theory of t"l' .:.-C
situated cognition .; "::">"
All epistemological theories (i.e. philosophical &lor
psychological theories about the nature of knowledge)
are just that - perceptions of a group of people about
what knowledge is and how it can be known. Commonly
we think of this as how learning takes place, although
theories of knowledge are not necessarily theories of
learning and are rarely theories of teaching. They do
allow us, however, to think about implications for
pedagogy. What do theories of situated cognition imply
for mathematics teaching?
The most obvious advice to teachers is to recognise that
transfer of knowledge from one context to another or
from concrete experience to abstract reasoning will not
necessarily happen without support, and may be more
difficult than assumed. Students need time and
appropriate activities in order to build a knowledge of
relationships between their everyday and their school-
mathematics experiences, as well as between the
various components of the mathematics curriculum.
They also need carefully-sequenced activities,
questions, and opportunities for discussion if they are
to move from specific physical activity to abstracted
generalisations. Similarly, students need
encouragement to apply their useful out-of-school
mathematical strategies to school content and
opportunities to see how other students do this.
The idea that learning takes place in a framework of
participation, and not in an individual mind, means that
there needs to ample time and space (in the form of
discussion, reflection, and representation of ideas in
varied formats) for understandings -to be developed
through human interaction and mediated by the
differences in perspective among the eo-participants.
Teachers also need to take the time to set up and develop
the social group's expectations. Are errors seen as
opportunities for learning by all? Is it important for the
class to learn number facts or achieve a certainly level of
other performance than it is to have winners and losers
in competitive activities?What patterns of interaction are
likely to be more productive that teacher-dominated
questioning-and how could that expectation of both
teachers and students be changed?
Next, it is important to consider the contributions that all
participants can make to a community of learning. There
are times when it is useful for teachers to tell, explain and
demonstrate, but also times when students need to listen
to, consider and respond to their own or each others'
ideas. Social negotiation of mathematical ideas does not
happen merely with reporting back of strategies and
solutions - much more stimulation is required.
Modelling the asking of probing questions (Why ...?
How ...? What if ...? If ...?) and expectations that students
will ask these is one appropriate strategy Setting some
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open questions that require more than procedural
knowledge is another.
Likewise, the belief that knowledge is created by social
groups acting together has implications that go further
than allowing or requiring group work. It must involve
consideration of how groups are structured, what
patterns of interaction are encouraged between class
members, and what types of activity (not all physicall)
are most useful? What group identity is sought, and how
can it best be achieved?
The notion of distributed cognition is vital. If
knowledge is created by eo-participants in a learning
activity, individuals will need encouragement to "make it
their own". Some teachers use a closure activity that
encourages reflection and articulation, such as journal
writing; but there are others forms of metacognitive
activity that will encourage children to personalise
knowledge. If learning is truly a group activity, we also
need to consider how it is best assessed. Similarly, if we
cannot describe individual "learning" separately from
changes in a social role or identity, what does this mean
for reporting?
The community of understanding that our students need
to be socialised into is that of mathematicians. This
seems obvious, but what occurs in most classrooms is far
from what mathematicians do. Teachers are generally
good at teaching the tools (words, symbols, simpler
processes) that mathematicians use; but most have had
less practice themselves in schools of other
mathematicians traditions (e.g. traditional patterns of
speech related to problem solving and proof),
Socialisation into being a good student is more common
that socialising into being a mathematician. This must
raise questions about the nature of core work in both
primary and secondary classrooms, and about the
patterns of daily interaction and assessment that would
support this.
Most school mathematics is operational. Particular
processes are being learned and these are not necessarily
seen as pan of a bigger structural picture. For example,
algebra and its functions need to be seen as generalised
arithmetic, and the decimal place value system as
underpinning fraction and measurement systems.
The claim summarised by Brown, Collins, and Duguid
(1989), that knowledge is inseparable from the occasions
and activities of which it is the product (p. 32), helps to
explain results that are often surprising. We have all
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known times when students have been taught a
computational process but cannot apply it to word
problems, and times when they complete problems at
the end of a chapter successfully but cannot do the same
problems as part of a mixed set of problem types.
Frequently students have had experiences of a
mathematical phenomenon or process in everyday "real
world" contexts but do not apply the resulting
knowledge while in class. They solve a familiar problem
easily mentally but have trouble solving it - and
sometimes even recognising it - as a written equation or
algorithm. Similar situations arise when students are
seen able to do something in a mathematics class, but
seem quite unfamiliar with an applied version of the
same idea in, say, a Physics class, or a work-situation
outside of schooling - the "numeracy" challenge. Non-
mathematics teachers and employers complain that
mathematics teachers aren't doing their job, while the
mathematics teachers can point to positive mathematics
test scores or other assessment of (apparent) learning in
mathematics classrooms.
Even within the mathematics classroom itself, a key idea
mastered successfully in one context (such as division of
whole numbers) seems to present difficulties in another,
e.g. when operating with decimal fractions or
measurements or in algebraic factorisation.
Situated cognition makes such phenomena more
understandable and suggests that we could work more
actively to prevent or remediate them
It is useful, too, to think of learners as apprentices, to
identify what needs to be learned for full participation in a
community and how this might best be facilitated in a
social setting. But what community? Assumptions about
schools being communities similar to workplaces where
apprentices participate are open to criticism (see, for
example, Adler, 1998; lerman, 1998). These critics point
out that teachers do not aim to produce mathematicians,
and are not mathematicians themselves. A mathematics
classroom community is a community not of mathematics
but of schooling, where students are becoming more
experienced students:
"Thus, while laver and Wenger's intentions are for a
general theorising, and they attend at moments ... to the
specificitiesof schooling, they in fact side-step difficulties
in using their conceptualisation to interpret and explain
teaching and learning in school" (Adler, 1998, p. 169).
Actually, lave herself proposed that the apprenticeship model
should not be importeduncritically into schools. Shemade a
(problematic) distinction between this model involving a
"learning curriculum" rather than a "teaching curriculum".
The feature of the theory that appeals most to me is its
focus on group inquiry and sense-making. It accounts for
diversity in students' understandings as well as goals but
sees these as essential and positive resources for learning
in a classroom community (Greeno, 1997). Further, in
discussing the dialectical development of individual
knowledge through interactions in social contexts, the
theory encourages us to think about the gap between
what is known by students and the knowledge of various
communities where mathematics is used. Another
drawcard for me is its recognition of the multi-faceted
nature of knowledge-making and of our social world.
Situated cognition I
... emphasizes the relational independency of agent
and world, activity, meaning, cognition, learning and
knowing. It emphasizes the inherently socially
negotiated quality of meaning and the interested,
concerned character of the thought and action of
persons engaged in activity ... in, with and arisingfrom
the socially and culturally constructed world. This world
is itselfsociallyconstituted. (lave, 1991, p. 67)
At the very least, the notion of cognition being bound in
particular contexts and inseparable from the social
situation and activities of which it is the product should
raise questions about:
(a) the ability of learners to apply knowledge gained
from the out -of-school contexts to school tasks,
(b) the ability of learners to transfer school
knowledge to broader contexts,
(c) ways that involvement in typical processes used in
mathematics teaching and learning shapes
knowledge of mathematics, what mathematics is,
and how it can be used;
(d) other messages that participation in school
mathematics gives students.
However, it is clear that the theory of situation cognition
raises many more worthy questions for teachers,
academics and curriculum developers.
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Editor's Note I
Jean Lave may be taken as one of the early, and important
pioneering steps in situated cognition. It is important to
realise that she has been contributing Significantly to
mathematics education for a long time. Early glimpses of
her focus on the situation, as a crucial aspect of
understanding what a student knows, and can do,
appears in Robert Daviss similarly pioneering
monograph Learning Mathematics: The Cognitive Science
Approach to Mathematics Education, Croom Helm,
London, 1984.
Davis describes the way arithmetic procedures were
carried out during supermarket shopping, meal
preparation, and other everyday settings. This study
highlighted the practical effectiveness of situated or
contexrualised problem solving skills, contrasted with
pencil-and-paper classroom instruction and practice. A
pencil-and-paper test of addition, subtraction,
multiplication, and division, applied to whole numbers,
fractions, and decimals, was contrasted with actual
everyday activities carried out in real contexts. The
results showed that her adult subjects scored a test
average of about 59%, whereas their everyday success on
the parallel "test items", in context, was 100% correct -
error-free (Davis 1984 pp 159-160)1 Lave's paper,
referred to by Davis, is:
Lave, Jean. (1982). 'Arithmetic procedures in everyday
situations': Paper presented at the Fourth Annual
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, 4-6 August.) .
